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Abstract Even if our justified beliefs are closed under known entailment, there may
still be instances of transmission failure. Transmission failure occurs when P entails
Q, but a subject cannot acquire a justified belief that Q by deducing it from P . Para-
digm cases of transmission failure involve inferences from mundane beliefs (e.g., that
the wall in front of you is red) to the denials of skeptical hypotheses relative to those
beliefs (e.g., that the wall in front of you is not white and lit by red lights). According
to the Bayesian explanation, transmission failure occurs when (i) the subject’s belief
that P is based on E , and (ii) P(Q|E) < P(Q). But there are compelling cases
of transmission failure where P(Q|E) > P(Q). No modifications of the Bayesian
explanation are capable of accommodating such cases, so the explanation must be
rejected as inadequate. Alternative explanations employing simple subjunctive condi-
tionals are fully capable of capturing all of the paradigm cases, as well as those missed
by the Bayesian explanation.
Keywords Transmission · Closure · Justification · Bayesian epistemology
1 Transmission failure
You can often enlarge your set of justified beliefs by deduction alone. Glancing at the
table, I see my wife’s keys. I justifiably believe that her keys are on the table, and then
come to believe (1) by a straightforward deductive inference:
(1) She doesn’t have the keys in her purse.
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Thus do I acquire a justified belief in (1). But while (2) also follows from my belief
that my wife’s keys are on the table, it doesn’t seem that I could come to justifiably
believe it in the same way:
(2) The keys on the table aren’t fakes left there by my wife to mislead me.
My justification for believing that my wife’s keys are on the table “fails to transmit”
to (2).1
If transmission fails from P to Q, deducing Q from P doesn’t enable you to acquire
a justified belief in Q. The existence of cases of transmission failure does not imply
that your set of justified beliefs isn’t closed under known entailment. Suppose that
they are; i.e., that whenever you have a justified belief in P and know that P entails
Q, you also have a justified belief in Q. This supposition is compatible with there
being some pairs of justified beliefs P and Q where you know that P entails Q, but
where you could not have acquired your justified belief in Q by deduction from P .
Transmission failure is compatible with a range of closure principles.2
Among those who accept that transmission failure is a genuine phenomenon, opin-
ions vary as to what explains it. In a series of papers, Crispin Wright has developed
two influential accounts of transmission failure.3 More recently, epistemologists have
suggested that we can instead understand transmission failure in probabilistic terms.
According to the “Bayesian explanation” for transmission failure, when E is your
evidence for P , you cannot acquire a justified belief in Q by deduction from P when
P(Q|E) < P(Q); i.e., when E lowers the probability of Q.
My purpose here is to examine the Bayesian explanation. After looking at some
paradigm cases of transmission failure (Sect. 2), I’ll lay out the Bayesian explanation
1 The term ‘transmission failure’ is from Crispin Wright (see Wright 1985, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2008). Recent
discussions include Davies (2003, 2004), Neta (2007), Okasha (2004), Pryor (2004, 2009), Silins (2005,
2007), Smith (2009).
2 Wright (2000) makes this point as well. I should note that the distinction between “transmission” and “clo-
sure” is murky, and that my characterization of transmission failure renders the phenomenon incompatible
with some “closure” principles. Consider, for example, this “closure” principle from Hawthorne:
If one knows P and competently deduces Q from P , thereby coming to believe Q, while retaining
one’s knowledge that P , one comes to know that Q (Hawthorne 2004, p. 29).
If a principle like Hawthorne’s is correct, then it is plausible that one can always gain a justified belief in
Q by deduction from P (provided the other conditions in the antecedent of the principle are satisfied), and
hence it is unlikely that there are any genuine cases of transmission failure as I have characterized it (see
Sect. 5 of Silins 2005 for a persuasive argument to this end). To save a principle like Hawthorne’s while
allowing genuine transmission failure, one could give a weaker definition of transmission failure than I
have. One might say that transmission fails from P to Q when the subject’s justification for believing P
cannot contribute to her justification for believing Q, though she can acquire a justified belief in Q by
deduction from P . I have no strong objection to such a characterization, though I do find the suggestion that
a belief could be justified by a factor which is purely independent of its basis to be somewhat troubling. In
any event, none of the arguments in the present paper turn on the resolution of these issues or on the precise
characterization of transmission failure.
3 See especially Wright (2000, 2002, 2003). Brown (2004) suggests repairs to Wright’s account. Some
authors have attempted to give a probabilistic version of Wright’s account (see Okasha 2004 and Chandler
2010), as well as unpublished work by Luca Moretti. Okasha attempts to give a Bayesian analysis of Wright’s
distinction between “direct” and “indirect” support. See note 12 below for brief discussion of Chandler’s
account.
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(Sect. 3). Then I’ll describe a case of transmission failure that the Bayesian explanation
can’t handle (Sect. 4). Analogous cases are simple to construct; the Bayesian expla-
nation misses a large swath of instances of the phenomenon it is supposed to explain.
After considering some possible responses on behalf of the Bayesian (Sect. 5), I’ll say
where I think it goes wrong (Sect. 6).
2 Paradigm cases
Our best evidence for the existence of transmission failure comes from cases. There
are many famous triads where, supposing that one’s evidence for P is E , it seems one
cannot gain justification for believing one of P’s entailments Q by deduction from P .
Here is Dretske’s famous example:
red
ER That wall appears to be red.
PR That wall is red.
Q R That wall is not white and illuminated by red lights.4
If ER is the basis for your justified belief in PR , then merely deducing Q R from PR
seems clearly not to be a way of acquiring a justified belief in Q R .5
Here’s another famous case from Dretske (1970):
zebra
EZ Those animals are horse-shaped, striped, in a pen marked ‘Zebras’, etc.
PZ Those are zebras.
Q Z Those aren’t mules cleverly disguised by the zoo authorities to look like zebras.
And the ubiquitous:
biv
EB It looks and feels like I have hands.
PB I have hands.
Q B I’m not a bodiless brain in a vat being fed hand-ish experiences.
In each triad, the first proposition is defeasible evidence sufficient to justify belief in
the second, and the second entails the third. But it is extremely implausible to say that
someone’s belief in the third could be justified by deduction from the second. These are
paradigm examples of transmission failure. Any account of the phenomenon should
either predict that transmission fails in these cases, or else explain why it so appears.
Note that the status of each case as an example of transmission failure depends
essentially upon E . Suppose that PR was justified not by ER but by your memory
of having painted the wall red this morning. Or that PZ was justified by your knowl-
edge of recent DNA tests on the animals before you. In either case, the appearance of
4 This example is originally due to Dretske (1970) and has been discussed more recently by Cohen (2002),
Pryor (2004), Wright (2002, 2008) and others.
5 Pryor comes close to denying this. He writes that your ER -based justification to believe PR “contributes
to the credibility of the claim that the wall isn’t white and lit by tricky lights” (Pryor 2004, p. 362). Still,
Pryor recognizes that something is fishy with the argument represented by Red, and attempts to provide an
alternative explanation for what’s gone wrong.
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transmission failure would disappear. Transmission failure does not occur from P to
Q simpliciter, but only relative to one’s evidence for P .
These cases needn’t be seen as counterexamples to closure. Suppose that if you have
a justified belief in PR , you must also have a justified belief in Q R . If transmission
fails in Red, then your justification for Q R must come from some source other than
deduction from PR . But there are many candidate sources. Perhaps you are justified in
believing that there are no red light bulbs in the house you are in. Or that white walls
convincingly lit by red lights are rare. Or maybe your justification comes from some
default entitlement to accept the proposition that things are as they appear.
Still, retaining closure while acknowledging transmission failure does invite skep-
tical danger. Consider BIV. If justified beliefs are closed under known entailment,
then you have a justified belief that you have hands only if you have a justified belief
that you are not a bodiless brain in a vat. But if transmission fails from your per-
ceptually-justified belief that you have hands to Q B , surely it fails from any such
perceptually-justified belief. So your justification for Q B can’t come from any per-
ceptually-justified beliefs that entail it. This makes it difficult to see where it could
come from, and hence how your belief that Q B could be justified.6
My concern here is not to address this skeptical worry, but to understand what goes
wrong in cases like BIV, Zebra, and Red. Why is it that beliefs in the various Q’s can’t
be justified by deduction from the relevant P’s? Or, at least, why does it seem that this
is the case?
3 The Bayesian explanation
According to the Bayesian explanation, when your justification for P comes from E ,
transmission fails from P to Q when Pr(Q|E) < Pr(Q).7
Given very plausible assumptions, we can show that the explanation correctly pre-
dicts that each of the paradigm cases is an example of transmission failure.
If the wall is white and illuminated by red lights, then it appears to be red; i.e.,
¬Q R entails ER .8 So,
Pr(ER |¬Q R) ≈ 1
6 One response is to deny that BIV is a case of transmission failure. This is how I understand Pryor’s
position. Another is to say that one’s justification for Q B comes from a non-perceptual source.
7 Silins (2007) offers the Bayesian explanation for why transmission fails in BIV. Hawthorne (2004, fn.
42), (Cohen, 2005, pp. 424–425), and White (2006) make similar suggestions. The only E–P–Q triads that
are candidates for transmission failure are cases where E is typically sufficient to give you justification to
believe P . Clearly, then, there will be other necessary conditions in addition to Pr(Q|E) < Pr(Q); e.g.,
that Pr(P|E) > Pr(P), or that Pr(P|E) meet or exceed some threshold of rational acceptability.
8 Properly speaking, of course, ¬Q R does not entail ER ; if there is a film of yellow plastic wrap covering
the wall, it will look orange, not red, when lit by red lights. This loose use of ‘entails’ is common in the
literature, and is required for the Bayesian explanation to get off the ground. Troubled readers can preface
‘entails’ with ‘together with relevant background assumptions, . . .’.
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In addition, ER was not certain in advance. The wall might have appeared green instead
of red. Thus,
Pr(ER) < 1
Hence Pr(ER |¬Q R) > Pr(ER). By Bayes’ Theorem, Pr(¬Q R |ER) > Pr(¬Q R).9
So,
Pr(Q R |ER) < Pr(Q R)
Similar reasoning will show that analogous inequalities are satisfied by Zebra and
BIV.
Why should this inequality lead to transmission failure? We understand Pr as a
function from propositions to a subject’s credences, and assume that when Pr(P|E) <
Pr(P), the subject ought rationally to lower her confidence in P on learning E . Thus in
Red she ought rationally to lower her confidence in Q R on learning ER . But how could
she gain justification to believe Q R by acquiring evidence that rationally enjoins her
to lower her confidence in Q R? Learning ER couldn’t directly justify belief in Q R if
the rational response to learning ER is to become less confident in Q R . Could learning
ER gave her indirect justification for Q R by giving her justification for PR? If it did,
then it would still be the case that ER would justify belief in Q R despite rationally
enjoining her to become less confident in Q R . And this seems implausible. So goes
the Bayesian explanation.10
Is it correct that any evidence which rationally enjoins you to lower your confidence
in P couldn’t also justify you in believing P? Maybe not always. I am holding a lottery
ticket and on the basis of an unjustified hunch I am certain that the odds of winning are
one in a hundred million. Letting P = that my ticket will lose, Pr(P) = 0.99999999,
given my belief about the odds. Since I have no evidence beyond my hunch that sup-
ports P , my belief that P is unjustified. Now I learn from an eminently trustworthy
source that the odds of winning are, in fact, one in ten million. Call this proposition E .
By learning E, I gain justification to believe P; my belief that P is now justified.
But letting E = that the odds of winning are one in ten million, Pr(P|E) < Pr(P); I
ought to lower my confidence in P upon learning E .
Still, the case of the lottery hunch is unusual in that one’s degree of confidence in
P prior to learning E is unjustified. Our paradigm cases of transmission failure do not
involve a transition from a previously unjustified degree of confidence in Q.
Here is a second potential difficulty. Suppose that when I have a visual experience
with the content P , I thereby learn P (at least when various background conditions are
satisfied), and that when I learn P , I am justified in setting Pr(P) to 1. And suppose
9 I assume throughout that Pr(¬Q R) > 0. The assumption is apt: it was not certain in advance that the
wall would not be white and illuminated by red lights.
10 Cf. Silins (2007). Silins argues that Moore’s (fictional) inference from his experientially-justified belief
that he has hands to the conclusion that he is not a bodiless brain in a vat having hand-like experiences is
an instance of transmission failure, since, as he puts it: “[I]f Moore’s experience makes his justification to
believe [Q R ] go up, then it can’t be that his confidence in [Q R ] should instead go down.” Contraposing: if
his confidence in Q R should go down, his experience does not make his justification to believe Q R go up.
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that when the wall appears to be red I have a visual experience with the content that
wall is red. Since PR entails Q R, Pr(Q R |PR) = 1. Thus when the wall looks red
to me, I learn that the wall is red, am thereby justified in setting Pr(PR) to 1, and
ought rationally to set Pr(Q R) to 1, as well. If this is the correct way to understand
the epistemology of visual experience, then it seems that the rational response to the
wall’s looking red to me is not for my confidence in Q R to go down, but rather to
go up. But, one might think, so much the worse for this picture of the epistemology
of visual experience. And in any event, it is easy to construct cases of transmission
failure where E is not plausibly regarded as the content of a visual experience.
A more serious problem is raised by Pryor (2009). Consider the following variant
of BIV:
EB It looks and feels like I have hands.
PB I have hands.
RB I have hands and I’m not a bodiless brain in a vat being fed handish experiences.
The intuition of transmission failure from PB to RB is nearly as strong as that in the
original case from PB to Q B . But RB is logically equivalent to PB ; thus Pr(PB |E) =
Pr(RB |E). So the Bayesian explanation fails to capture this variant. Now, one might
reply by pointing out that RB is nothing more than the conjunction of PB and the
original Q B , and that the intuition of transmission failure from PB to (PB & Q B),
though a misfire, is harmless enough given that there is genuine transmission failure
from PB to Q B . But this case portends bigger trouble for the Bayesian. In the next
section, I shall consider some more general difficulties for her explanation along these
lines.
4 Problem cases
The Bayesian explanation fulfills one key desideratum of an explanation for transmis-
sion failure: it accurately predicts the paradigm cases discussed in Sect. 2. But there
are other intuitive cases of transmission failure it does not predict. A minor tweak to
the account can capture the first family of cases, but the there is no obvious fix for the
second.
4.1 Transmission failure when Pr(Q|E) ≈ Pr(Q)
When E and ¬Q are independent, Pr(¬Q|E) ≈ Pr(¬Q), so Pr(Q|E) ≈ Pr(Q),
and hence it is not the case that Pr(Q|E) < Pr(Q). But there are intuitive cases of
transmission failure where E and ¬Q are independent. For example:
meg
EM Meg’s train was scheduled to arrive at six o’clock, the station is a few blocks
from here, and she’s planning to walk over.
PM Meg will be here shortly.
QM Meg wasn’t just rushed to the hospital after collapsing of a heart attack.
If your belief in PM is justified by EM , you can’t acquire a justified belief in QM by
deducing it from PM . But QM is unrelated to EM : unless Meg’s heart is unusually
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weak, or some other extraordinary background condition obtains, the probability of
QM is unaffected by EM . So Pr(QM |EM ) ≈ Pr(QM ). Thus the Bayesian explana-
tion does not predict that Meg is a case of transmission failure.
It is very easy to construct cases like Meg. Begin with some evidence E that does
not entail P but which would ordinarily justify belief in P . Then imagine a scenario
S such that (i) S entails ¬P , (ii) S and E are independent, and (iii) if S were true, you
could easily falsely believe P on the basis of E . Let Q = ¬S. The resulting E–P–Q
triad will elicit a strong intuition of transmission failure, but it will not be the case that
Pr(Q|E) < Pr(Q).
However, a modest tweak to the Bayesian explanation enables it to capture cases
like this. We simply replace the “<” with “”: an E–P–Q triad is a case of transmis-
sion failure only if Pr(Q|E)  Pr(Q). Meg satisfies this condition, as will any case
where E and Q are independent. But a more serious problem is at hand.
4.2 Transmission failure when Pr(Q|E) > Pr(Q)
We can also construct cases of transmission failure where E raises the probability
of Q.
colored
You are in a house with 100 rooms. 49 are painted white, and 51 are painted red.
Of the white rooms, one is lit by red lights, and four others are lit by lights of
other colors. All of the red rooms are lit by white lights. You’re about to open
the door to the first room in the house.
Opening the door to the first room, you notice that it looks red and reason as follows:
ER That wall appears to be red.
PR That wall is red.
RR That wall is not white and illuminated by colored lights.
Colored appears to be a case of transmission failure. If your belief in PR is justified
by ER , you cannot acquire a justified belief in RR by deduction from PR . But the
Bayesian explanation fails to predict as much. Since 50 of the 100 rooms look red,
Pr(ER) = 0.5
Of the five white rooms lit by red or colored lights, only one looks red. So,
Pr(ER |¬RR) = 0.2
Thus Pr(ER |¬RR) < Pr(ER). By Bayes’ Theorem, Pr(¬RR |ER) < Pr(¬RR),
and hence Pr(RR |ER) > Pr(RR). The wall’s appearing red raises the probability
that it’s not white and lit by colored lights.
Colored is by no means an isolated example. Many E–P–Q triads that exhibit
transmission failure where Pr(Q|E) < Pr(Q) can be turned into such cases. First,
choose some R such that (i) P entails R, (ii) R entails Q, but not vice versa, and (iii)
R makes Q psychologically salient. For example, you can replace Zebra’s Q Z with:
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RZ Those are neither mules disguised like zebras nor deer disguised like gazelles.
Then specify the relevant background information so that Pr(E |¬R) is relatively low.
In this case, we might suppose that the zoo frequently disguises deer as gazelles, so
that ¬RZ makes it likely that the animals in front of you look like gazelles, not zebras.
Et voilà! An intuitive case of transmission failure which the Bayesian explanation is
unable to predict.
5 Bayesian responses
The proponent of the Bayesian explanation could respond to a case like Colored in one
of two ways. The first is to deny that it is a case of transmission failure. The second is
to attempt to accommodate it with a more drastic modification of the explanation. I’ll
consider each response in turn.
5.1 Is Colored a case of transmission failure?
Could it be that Colored is not a case of transmission failure? If it’s not, then the fact
that the Bayesian explanation fails to predict as much is a virtue, not a cost. But this
is a difficult position to maintain: it’s hard to deny that Colored is a case of trans-
mission failure while also maintaining that Red is one. And clearly it’s not open to
the proponent of the Bayesian explanation to deny that Red is a case of transmission
failure.
Suppose that transmission fails in Red but not in Colored. Now consider the fol-
lowing argument:
ER That wall appears to be red.
PR That wall is red.
RR That wall is not white and illuminated by colored lights.
Q R That wall is not white and illuminated by red lights.
Does this argument specify a route to acquiring a justified belief in Q R? If the answer
is “no,” then the step at which transmission fails must be from RR to Q R , since (given
our supposition) it does not fail before then. But this is quite implausible. “I can
deduce from its being red that it isn’t white and lit by colored lights. But I can’t go on
to conclude that it’s not white and lit by red lights!”
On the other hand, if the answer is “yes,” then while you can’t acquire a justi-
fied belief in Q R by deduction from PR , you can acquire one by a more circuitous
deduction that detours through the (stronger!) RR . This, too, is quite implausible.
5.2 Modification I: infection
The alternative to denying that Colored is a case of transmission failure is to modify
the Bayesian explanation in a way that captures such cases.
Note that Q R is entailed by RR . Perhaps the transmission failure exhibited by Red
somehow “infects” Colored. How could we modify the Bayesian explanation to cap-
ture this infection? Here is an obvious suggestion. Let us suppose that an E–P–R
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triad is an instance of transmission failure just in case either (i) Pr(R|E)  Pr(R)
(ordinary cases) or (ii) R entails some Q such that Pr(Q|E)  Pr(Q) (infection
cases). This account would accurately predict that Colored is a case of transmission
failure.
But the proposal is far too strong. If we allow it, then virtually any E–P–R triad
will count as an infection case. For example:
orange
EO That wall appears to be orange.
PO That wall is orange.
RO That wall is not yellow.
Orange is clearly not a case of transmission failure; deduction from PO is a perfectly
good way to acquire a justified belief in RO . However, RO entails QO :
QO That wall is not yellow and illuminated by red lights.
And Pr(QO |EO) < Pr(QO), for reasons that are by now familiar. Thus the proposed
modification incorrectly implies that Orange is a case of transmission failure.
5.3 Modification II: dragging
In his unpublished manuscript “Dragging and Confirming,” Matthew Kotzen argues
that when E confirms P , E also confirms P’s entailment Q only if Pr(Q) < Pr(P|E).
Kotzen calls this the dragging condition. He suggests that in cases of transmission fail-
ure, the dragging condition is not satisfied. Note that if P entails Q and Pr(Q|E) <
Pr(Q), the dragging condition can’t be satisfied, so any case predicted by the Bayesian
explanation to be a case of transmission failure will also fail to satisfy the dragging
condition.11 But a triad could fail to satisfy the dragging condition even if Pr(Q|E) >
Pr(Q). Perhaps, then, an account that incorporates the dragging condition will cap-
ture what is wrong in Colored without being overly strong. Following Kotzen, let us
propose that an E–P–Q triad is a case of transmission failure when the dragging
condition is not satisfied; i.e., when Pr(P|E) ≤ Pr(Q).
Unfortunately, the proposal does not work with Colored. You know that 95 of 100
rooms are not white and lit by colored lights, so
Pr(RR) = 0.95
The chances of a red-looking room’s being red are 49 in 50, so
Pr(PR |ER) = 0.98
Thus Pr(RR) < Pr(PR |ER); the dragging condition is satisfied. So the proposal is
too weak.12
11 Since P entails Q, Pr(P|E) ≤ Pr(Q|E). Thus, if Pr(Q|E) < Pr(Q), Pr(P|E) < Pr(Q).
12 This is no complaint against the dragging condition itself, which Kotzen’s fine paper has convinced
me is necessary for E to confirm P’s entailments; i.e., for E to function as evidence for P’s entailments.
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6 Where things stand
If the Bayesian explanation is thought of as an attempt to state a true sufficient condi-
tion for transmission failure, then it is unscathed by the cases discussed above. None
shows that transmission can succeed even if Pr(Q|E) > Pr(Q). But if the Bayesian
explanation is seen as an attempt to state a true necessary condition for transmission
failure, then Colored undermines its adequacy. Given the failure of the two “patches”
to the explanation that I considered above, it is not clear how the Bayesian explanation
could be modified to restore its adequacy.
The non-necessity of Pr(Q|E) < Pr(Q) to cases of transmission failure under-
mines the claim that the presence of the inequality explains why transmission fails.
Giving a sufficient condition for a fact is not explaining that fact. That the curfew is
later than 10pm is sufficient for its being later than 9pm, but it does not explain why
it is later than 9pm. One condition explains another only when the second is the case
because of the first; if the first is unnecessary for the second, it is harder to make the
case that the second is the case because of the first. The existence of transmission
failure when Pr(Q|E) > Pr(Q) weakens the claim that transmission fails in our
paradigm cases because Pr(Q|E) < Pr(Q). Even if the presence of the inequality
is predictive of transmission failure, that the inequality is unnecessary suggests that it
is not explanatory.
It is open to the proponent of the Bayesian explanation to say that while the fact
that Pr(Q|E) < Pr(Q) does not explain transmission failure in Colored, the pres-
ence of the inequality does explain why transmission fails in the paradigm cases. It
is possible for different instances of a one phenomenon to have distinct explanations.
This response would be satisfying only if no unified explanation for the phenomena
were available. In the next section I will suggest two such alternatives.
7 Two explanations involving subjunctive conditionals
The alternatives both feature a subjunctive conditional. Suppose that transmission
of justification from an E-based belief that P to Q is blocked when the following
conditional is false:
S If Q were false, E would be false.13
In each of our paradigm cases, if Q were false, E would be true, and so S is false. In
Red, the wall would appear to be red if it were white and illuminated by red lights.
Footnote 12 continued
The lesson of Colored is that E can confirm P’s entailment Q even if you can’t acquire a justified belief in
Q by deduction from P .
Note, too, that Colored is a counterexample to Chandler (2010)’s proposal that in cases of transmission
failure it must be that Pr(P|E) > t ⊃ Pr(Q) > t , where t marks a “threshold sufficient for rational
acceptability.” Let t = 0.97. Then Pr(PR |ER) > t , but Pr(RR) < t . If this is too low a threshold, raise
the total number of rooms in the example. Provided t < 1, the details of Colored can be specified so that
Chandler’s conditional remains unsatisfied.
13 Some readers may find it easier to interpret the conditional if stated as: Q would not be true unless E
were true.
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In Zebra, those animals would be horse-shaped, striped, and so on if they were mules
cleverly disguised to look like zebras. And in BIV, it would look and feel like I have
hands if I were a bodiless brain in a vat. Thus in each of our paradigm cases, S is false.
In Meg, we have the same result. If Meg were just rushed to the hospital after
collapsing of a heart attack, her train would still have been scheduled to arrive at six
o’clock, the station would still have been a few blocks away, and so on. So here, too, S
is false. In Colored, matters are somewhat more delicate. Given the background of the
case, it does not seem true that if the wall were white and lit by colored lights, it would
appear red. If the wall were white and lit by colored lights, it might look to be some
other color than red. But it is clear enough, given the background of the case, that if
the wall were white and lit by colored lights, it might look red. So if the following
argument is valid, Colored satisfies the condition under consideration:
(3) If the wall were white and lit by colored lights, it might look red.
∴ It is false that: if the wall were white and lit by colored lights, it would not look
red.
Is (3) valid? It is commonly assumed that “might”-conditionals are the duals of the
corresponding “would”-conditionals; i.e., that “If A were true, C would be true” is
equivalent to “It is not the case that if A were true, C might not be true”.14 The “duality
thesis,” as this assumption is often known, implies that (3) is valid. Given the duality
thesis, the present condition predicts that Colored is a case of transmission failure.15
But the duality thesis is controversial. Another view has it that a “might”-condi-
tional expresses the possibility that the corresponding “would”-conditional is true.16
On this reading, (3) is not valid. Instead, (4) is valid:
(4) If the wall were white and lit by colored lights, it might look red.
∴ It is possible that: if the wall were white and lit by colored lights, it would look
red.
What sort of possibility is at issue here? The most common idea is that it is episte-
mic possibility.17 On this understanding of the “might” conditional, in Colored it is
epistemically possible that the wall would look red if it were white and lit by colored
lights. This suggests an explanation of transmission failure involving S’s contradic-
tory. Suppose that an E–P–Q triad is an instance of transmission failure whenever S∗
is epistemically possible:
14 Lewis’s semantics for counterfactual conditionals assumes the duality thesis (see Lewis 1973, p. 21).
While the antecedent of S contains a “were”, I am not suggesting that the conditional should be read as a
counterfactual.
15 If we read S as a counterfactual and interpret it using the possible worlds semantics in Lewis (1973),
then the proposal here is closely related to the possible worlds account of transmission failure for knowl-
edge given by Smith (2009). However, this interpretation invites the standard sorts of objections raised
against counterfactual analyses of epistemic phenomena; to wit, counterexampling by cases where subjects
in “nearby” possible world are in a different epistemic situations than that of the actual subject.
16 For discussions of this rival view see Stalnaker (1984) and DeRose (1994). Unpublished work by Matt
Benton was helpful to me here.
17 The version of the view DeRose discusses reads the “might” as expressing epistemic possibility. Stalna-
ker’s view is less straightforward; for him the “might” can express different sorts of possibility in different
contexts, though normally it is epistemic.
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S∗ If Q were false, E would be true.
This explanation correctly predicts that Colored is a case of transmission failure, and
it fares just as well with our paradigm cases, as well. It is surely epistemically possible
that if the wall were white and lit by red lights, it would look red; that those animals
would be horse-shaped, striped, and so on if they were mules cleverly disguised to
look like zebras; and that it would look and feel like I have hands if I were a bodiless
brain in a vat.
So now we have two alternatives to the Bayesian explanation, both of which capture
the paradigm cases and Colored with a single condition. The first assumes the duality
thesis and says that transmission fails when S is false. The second is independent of the
duality thesis and says that transmission fails when S∗ is epistemically possible. Obvi-
ously, each stands in need of refinement, further testing, and supplementation with a
deeper account of why transmission fails when the proposed condition is satisfied.18
Even without that work, the apparent availability of simple, superior alternatives to
the Bayesian explanation completes the present case against it.
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18 An anonymous reviewer makes the following interesting suggestion. Let’s characterize an undermining
defeater relative to E and P as any evidence against the claim that if P were false, E would be false (this
roughly follows (Pollock 1974, pp. 42–43). The suggestion is that when S is true or S∗ is epistemically
possible, given that P entails Q,¬Q is an undermining defeater relative to E and P . Then my proposal
can be recast as follows: justification from an E-based belief that P fails to transmit to Q when ¬Q is an
undermining defeater relative to E and P .
I hesitate to endorse this suggestion for two reasons. The first is that Pryor argues nicely against a very
similar approach, which he calls the “Anti-Underminer Model” of transmission failure, in the last section
of Pryor (2009). His counterexamples appear to presuppose a broader notion of “undermining defeat” than
that given here using the subjunctive conditional, though clearly the question of how well the suggestion
could resist his objections would require careful work and can’t be answered here.
The second reason is that I fear that the characterization of an undermining defeater is too strong.
Consider again Orange:
orange
EO That wall appears to be orange.
PO That wall is orange.
RO That wall is not yellow.
Since PO entails RO ,¬RO is evidence against PO . But in a context where one is staring at an orange-look-
ing wall, it seems to me that any evidence one might gain that the wall is not orange would also be evidence
against the claim that if the wall were not orange, it would not appear to be orange. “Well, it clearly looks
orange, but now I’ve got evidence that it’s not orange, so that leads me to doubt that it wouldn’t look orange
unless it were orange.” So I fear that in this case ¬RO could turn out to satisfy the characterization of an
undermining defeater. Obviously this would spell trouble for the proposal about transmission failure, since
transmission seems clearly not to fail in Orange. More seriously, though, it makes the Pollock-inspired
characterization of an undermining defeater look suspect.
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